








Whose foreign policy? Britain’s ‘inner Cabinet’ and the Eastern Crisis, January–March 1878.

At the height of the great Eastern crisis in 1878, so its first chroniclers recorded, Britain’s Foreign Secretary Lord Derby – despite nominally being in office – was effectively replaced by his colleagues in an ‘inner Cabinet’ led by Prime Minister Lord Beaconsfield (better known to posterity as Benjamin Disraeli). According to the story, the Foreign Secretary was left isolated and irrelevant for a two-month period between January 1878 and his final departure from Cabinet in March 1878. This period came at a crucial juncture in the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78, a conflict that potentially impinged on vital British interests in the Mediterranean and the Near East. The ‘inner Cabinet’ solidified in the historiography of the crisis and lives on, suitably modified, in recent accounts.
Despite its centrality in the British narrative of the Eastern crisis and the startling nature of the claims about a Foreign Secretary being bypassed while in office, no detailed assessment of this alleged development has been published. No historian has considered the full range of evidence relating to the ‘inner Cabinet’ in the foreign policy-making process, including new documents which have emerged from the Derby family archives at Knowsley. Neither has the provenance of the story nor its linkage with domestic electoral politics been thoroughly investigated. This article addresses this gap in our understanding, considering the detailed evidence, locating it in the context of the election campaign of 1879-80 where the story properly belongs, and examining both the Conservative and Liberal utilisation of Derby’s reputation in that campaign. It proposes that there was no ‘inner Cabinet’; it did not exist even in modified form. The story was a by-product of a broader struggle about party-political identity in foreign affairs, and serves as a useful reminder of the importance of domestic politics in framing the foreign-policy narrative.


The fifteenth Earl of Derby was central to the story of British foreign policy in this period. His reputation was an asset at the formation of Beaconsfield’s government in 1874: Derby had served in three previous administrations, including as Foreign Secretary between 1866 and 1868, and his father had been Conservative leader for twenty years. The owner of extensive lands in industrial Lancashire, he brought authority, weight and power to the Cabinet. He was widely expected to succeed as party leader. During the Conservatives’ first years in office, however, tensions emerged between the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary. Beaconsfield wanted a more ‘active’ foreign policy of the kind pursued in the 1850s and ’60s by the Liberal Viscount Palmerston. He was unavailing against Derby until, in the wake of Russia’s victory over Turkey in the war of 1877-78, the Cabinet’s pressure to take a belligerent line against Russia – in order to protect British interests in the region – prompted the Foreign Secretary’s resignation on 23 January 1878.
After this, domestic and international circumstances shifted rapidly and Derby’s colleagues persuaded him to withdraw his resignation. He therefore returned, for eight weeks between 27 January and 28 March. It is on that period that this analysis first focuses. Though short, it saw the British respond to the Treaty of San Stefano, the punitive settlement imposed by the Russians on the Turks after they had won the war. It was also during this period that, it has been alleged, Derby was rendered ineffectual to the point of irrelevance, partly by drunkenness, incompetence and indecision, and partly by an inner Cabinet made up of Beaconsfield, the third Marquis of Salisbury (Secretary of State for India), and Lord Cairns (the Lord Chancellor). Derby resigned again, this time for good, following the Cabinet’s endorsement of an aggressive British opposition to San Stefano. Beaconsfield and Salisbury, Derby’s successor, then achieved a significant diplomatic victory over the Russians at the Congress of Berlin in May 1878, when the treaty was unravelled by the Great Powers. Thereafter, however, ministers encountered a succession of domestic, imperial and overseas problems, all of which contributed to the loss of the next election. In March 1880, in the midst of that election campaign, Derby announced his defection to the Liberal Party.
Despite its brevity, the period between Derby’s two resignations has attracted significant scholarly attention. Three strands of thought have emerged, though no historian has examined in detail the archival sources relating to the ‘inner Cabinet’ episode. The first strand dates from the inter-war period. In 1920, Beaconsfield’s biographer, George Earle Buckle, gave his authority to a charge that had circulated for some years: ‘Derby…during this last couple of months of office, was reduced in regard to the Eastern Question, apparently without protest if not with his own consent, almost to the position of an under-secretary, serving the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, seeing Ambassadors and writing despatches on their behalf, but without independence or initiative of his own.’​[1]​ According to Salisbury’s biographer, Gwendolen Cecil, ‘An inner Cabinet was formed to direct the activities of the rest. It consisted of the Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury and Lord Cairns.’​[2]​ In his account of the Eastern crisis, R.W. Seton-Watson took the same line: ‘Major decisions had of course in the last issue to go before the Cabinet, but till that final stage Derby was virtually never consulted and then generally found his hand forced. He on his side swallowed the affronts and set himself deliberately to act as a brake upon his colleagues, most of whom were chafing for his dismissal.’​[3]​
In the second strand the ‘inner Cabinet’ story was modified, but the Foreign Secretary still occupied a secondary (or even peripheral) place in policy formation. In 1979, Richard Millman rejected the story of an inner Cabinet. But he thought that ‘the formulation of policy was undertaken by those members of the Cabinet who were near the Prime Minister or who took the initiative in placing themselves in his presence.’​[4]​ In this school of thought might also be placed Marvin Swartz. He speculated that, by March 1878, ‘Derby’s “reason had suffered” during the previous two years of strain’, and he suggested that the Foreign Secretary’s power had evaporated in his last two months of office: ‘Within the Cabinet, Lord Derby alone continued to resist an active policy in the Near East; but the Foreign Secretary could merely delay the implementation of decisions over which he had no control’.​[5]​ In 2011 Milos Kovic almost returned to the Cecil view, proposing that ‘Instead of Derby…the Prime Minister now co-operated most closely with Salisbury and Cairns.’​[6]​ In a similar vein, if more guardedly, T.G.Otte has described the Prime Minister’s ‘efforts to concentrate policy-making powers in the Cabinet’ instead of with Derby.​[7]​
By contrast, the third strand has challenged the story of the ‘inner Cabinet’, though none of its exponents has considered the allegation in detail. John Vincent edited Derby’s diaries, and in his view, ‘The thesis of Derby as the “lame duck” foreign secretary now looks questionable, especially in the extreme form in which it was put forward by Lord Salisbury’s biographer.’​[8]​ He assigned to Derby a much greater degree of significance than had previous historians.​[9]​ Vincent was followed by others who went further. John Charmley characterised the last two months of Derby’s tenure as a struggle between equally-matched foes: ‘If we accept the Cairns/Salisbury version, it is difficult to explain why Derby did stay [after 27 January]; if we accept Derby’s account and the contemporaneous record, this problem vanishes. Derby stayed because he was Foreign Secretary in fact as well as in name – which meant that the struggle went on.’​[10]​ Bendor Grosvenor agreed: ‘Certainly, Salisbury, Cairns and Disraeli may have met privately to have determined their own favoured policy, but this was in opposition to Derby, not in place of him.’​[11]​ Charmley thought the story of the inner Cabinet served a useful function for the Conservative leadership in their retrospective justification of events: ‘It certainly excuses the lapse in letting Derby back; it was certainly meant to do that. But was it true?’​[12]​
That question prompts a more fundamental one: who controlled British foreign policy between late January and late March 1878? Answering it is not straightforward and requires a careful analysis of the remaining evidence. On the one hand, there are the detailed papers of the protagonists in the ‘inner Cabinet’ – Beaconsfield, Salisbury and Cairns – from the crucial eight weeks in 1878, augmented by the papers of Salisbury’s nephew Arthur Balfour (then a young Conservative MP; much later, Prime Minister) and the Liberal politician Charles Dilke. On the other, there is material which indicates Derby’s capacity for carrying out the normal business of government. Each section of evidence needs assembling to gain a clearer sense of where power lay during this middle phase of the Eastern crisis, after Russia had defeated the Turks but before the Great Powers reconstructed the peace at Berlin.

As Charmley acknowledged, the story of the ‘inner Cabinet’ seems to have its origin in Balfour’s papers. In 1880, the latter recorded a conversation with Salisbury. According to Balfour’s notes, Salisbury recalled that in 1878 Derby had been, ‘between overwork, alcohol and responsibility, in a condition of utter moral prostration, doing as little as was possible and doing that little under compulsion.’​[13]​ Balfour noted that it was not just Salisbury who supplied information. Salisbury’s Cabinet colleague Lord Cairns had also described the difficulties of working with the former Foreign Secretary: ‘As the Lord Chancellor [Cairns] told me the other day’, wrote Balfour, ‘ “During the last year (I think he said) of office all that Derby did was done at the point of a bayonet.” I believe during that period the [Lord] Chancellor wrote his despatches for him and, so to speak, put the pen in his hand and made him sign.’​[14]​
Only one other contemporary account seems to have survived in written form, among the papers of the Liberal statesman Charles Dilke, who served in Gladstone’s administration after Beaconsfield’s defeat.​[15]​ It dates from a year later than Balfour’s notes (although it was only made public during the First World War) and seems to corroborate them. In 1917, the first volume of the Life of Sir Charles Dilke included the following section:

In 1881 Sir Charles, while Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, became aware that Lord Derby’s retention of office after his first resignation had been little more than nominal. He says in the Memoir for that year: “In the course of my researches among the Tunis papers I discovered the curious fact that in February and March, 1878, foreign affairs were being conducted by a committee of the Cabinet, consisting of Lord Beaconsfield, Lord Cairns, and Lord Salisbury, and that Lord Derby…was virtually shelved for the whole period.”​[16]​

In fact, Dilke’s unpublished memoir is rather less clear than his biographers suggested. Dilke did not mention Tunis, despite his biographers’ assertion, and close examination of the surviving Tunis papers suggest that Derby remained in charge of policy as he always had done. The drafts of despatches to Tunis, archived in London, were all quite clearly checked and signed by Derby in the normal manner, while the incoming letters from Sir Richard Wood in Tunis also bear Derby’s initial as normal.​[17]​
In a slightly different context, however, Dilke did use the words attributed to him. In May 1881 he recorded his discovery that in early 1878 ‘Ld. Derby (I shd. fancy the suggestion…probably came from Ld Salisbury) proposed the creation of a Mediterranean League for the maintenance of the Mediterranean status quo.’​[18]​ After some details about this proposal he noted, cryptically, ‘Consult Lord Derby’.​[19]​ This might have meant he had consulted him or that he needed to consult him, although there is no evidence in either Dilke’s memoir or Derby’s diary that any consultation took place. More significantly, however, on the other side of the page he noted (as his biographers almost recorded), ‘I find that at that moment f[oreig]n affairs were conducted by a Committee of the Cabinet consisting of Ld. Beaconsfield, Ld. Cairns and Ld. Salisbury - & that Ld Derby was virtually shelved. This idea was Ld. Beaconsfield’s.’​[20]​ This seems to be corroboration of Balfour’s account from an objective third party. The problem, of course, is that we have no idea who or what was Dilke’s source; it is quite likely that it was Balfour or Salisbury. Without further explicit references to this episode, the historian needs, first, to turn back to the crucial eight weeks in 1878 to assess the surviving papers.
Those relating to Lord Cairns are the least revealing. Beaconsfield undoubtedly liked to do business with Cairns, and had done for some years. Back in the summer of 1876, for example, at the beginning of Liberal agitation about Turkish atrocities in the Balkans, Gathorne Hardy, the Secretary of State for War, had written to Cairns, worrying about the ‘stir about the atrocities’. He explained that ‘I write to you because I know that you generally are more consulted on foreign affairs than others of the Cabinet.’​[21]​ Cairns consistently remained a confidant of the Prime Minister. At the end of December 1877 he had co-operated closely with Beaconsfield in an attempt to gain Austrian support for British mediation in the East, drafting a long memorandum to that end.​[22]​ That was, in turn, forwarded to Derby by Beaconsfield in the clear hope that he could avoid consulting the rest of the Cabinet at all.​[23]​ If, via co-operation with his senior lieutenants, the Prime Minister might outmanoeuvre the Cabinet, there were obvious advantages to these private alliances. This attempt, though, was effectively rebutted by Derby.​[24]​ Beaconsfield clearly tried to bypass those who disagreed with him (though succeeding in doing so was another matter altogether), and Cairns continued to play an important part in Cabinet discussions on foreign policy. At the Cabinet of 20 March, for example, Hardy recorded in his diary that ministers ‘adopted a proposal of Cairns’ regarding a message to Russia.​[25]​ But this is as far as evidence goes for Cairns’ involvement, and none of it seems to have been out of the ordinary for normal discussion of FO business.
In the shifting circumstances of early 1878, Beaconsfield was also confiding in and increasingly reliant upon Salisbury, but this proved only their shared frustration with Derby, not success against him. In the Salisbury papers at Hatfield House there is extensive evidence of their contacts. On 30 January 1878, Beaconsfield wrote to Salisbury encouraging action on the news that a Russian occupation of Constantinople seemed likely, noting that ‘I greatly, almost entirely, depend on you.’​[26]​ This is unsurprising. Given Derby’s obstruction of Beaconsfield’s preferred hard line against Russia – which Salisbury supported, but which Derby considered unnecessarily provocative – Salisbury’s position in ministerial dynamics became crucial: he was the most significant minister after Derby. On 6 February, another letter was sent to Salisbury by the Prime Minister, to muster support in the wake of news from Constantinople that the Russians were advancing.​[27]​ The following day, the Cabinet (including Derby) agreed on a concerted response, but there is no evidence that this was the product of anything other than the normal processes of Cabinet discussion.​[28]​ The next surviving exchange between the Prime Minister and the India Secretary was on 10 February, when Salisbury wrote to Beaconsfield, ‘fearing that efforts will be made in Cabinet’ on 11 February – presumably by Derby – ‘to prevent the [British] fleet being ordered to force its way in [to the Dardanelles].’​[29]​ This fear proved groundless, as it turned out. The collaboration, however, was evidence of weakness rather than strength; of the fear that an implacable Foreign Secretary with political authority could frustrate even a Prime Minister with strong allies.​[30]​
There is then a month-long gap in the surviving Beaconsfield-Salisbury correspondence until a letter of 18 March 1878, not long before Derby’s final resignation, when it is very clear that Beaconsfield was moving behind Derby’s back. Britain had made a series of demands of Russia, including that the whole Treaty of San Stefano be laid before a congress of the Great Powers. According to Beaconsfield, who had opened his own private channels of communication, the Russian ambassador Count Shuvalov ‘has got the answer [to those demands], but keeps it in his pocket. It is a refusal, &, according to him, the English proposal will never be accepted.’​[31]​ But neither Beaconsfield nor Shuvalov intended to tell the Foreign Secretary until they had made their respective diplomatic forays. When Derby saw the ambassador ‘he gave me an answer about the congress, so ambiguous that I could make nothing of it’.​[32]​ With Derby thus uninformed, Beaconsfield was keen that Salisbury and he should take advantage of the situation and ‘talk over these affairs together’.​[33]​ All this subterfuge certainly suggests an effort to circumvent their colleague, but to what end? It is evidence of gossip and plotting, but nothing substantive. Gossip, meanwhile, was also being used to blacken the name of Derby’s wife.
The penultimate exchange in the Salisbury-Beaconsfield correspondence is about allegations of leaks from the Cabinet, which had been circulating for some time. Salisbury thought they came from Derby or from his wife; her role was the subject of separate rumours which have been examined elsewhere.​[34]​ This was damaging to Derby, but evidence only of his colleagues’ desire – whether justifiable or not – to impugn his wife’s integrity, and by implication his own. None of this suggests that others had control over foreign policy; again, rather the reverse, that Derby’s ability to frustrate the rest of the Cabinet was such that he needed undermining. As late as 16 March 1878, Derby seems to have been able to obstruct his colleagues: the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Stafford Northcote, grumbled to Salisbury that Derby had thwarted his desire to call a Cabinet.​[35]​ All of this, time and again, suggests that the Foreign Secretary remained powerful enough to be a brake on a more active British policy.
After that, the last relevant letter in the Salisbury papers is from Beaconsfield on 21 March 1878, attempting to co-ordinate plans with Salisbury in advance of a Cabinet on 23 March.​[36]​ The latter’s reply the same day is certainly evidence that Salisbury and Beaconsfield were preparing a course of action in response to the expected news about the terms of the treaty of San Stefano, and perhaps they had also communicated with Cairns (though no trace remains). But the surviving evidence suggests a fairly typical set of discussions between ministers with strongly-held views. Such a situation is hardly unusual in British history. The most one can conclude is that Derby’s colleagues were attempting to circumvent him, but the evidence in the surviving papers highlights their inability to do so.
In addition to the notes made by Balfour and Dilke, and the surviving papers in the Cairns, Salisbury and Beaconsfield archives, there is what one might call ‘indirect’ evidence of attempts to create alternative policies. One such occasion concerned a possible occupation of a Turkish island as a British naval base. On 7 March, a Cabinet was held at which such an eventuality was (inconclusively) discussed, and the ‘inner Cabinet’ acted together. Hardy recorded the occasion: ‘We had a Cabinet at 2 yesterday which was rather exciting…Salisbury, Cairns and Beaconsfield for the special action [an occupation].’​[37]​ But there was no clear agreement. Hardy thought the projected occupation ‘not of significance, nothing real about it, leading to no present or future advantage, [but there was] no policy clearly laid down as to what we wd. or wd. not do or assent to.’​[38]​ Derby thought ‘the decision seemed to be taken to occupy Mytilene. I say “seemed” for at the last moment Northcote and Hardy both wavered…I maintained my objection but nothing more was necessary, for we agreed to discuss the question again today.’​[39]​ This was a Cabinet where foreign policy was in a state of inertia, which suited Derby well because it was Beaconsfield’s propensity to take warlike action that he feared was the greatest threat to peace. He had attempted (unsuccessfully) to explain to Salisbury over Christmas 1877 that the Prime Minister

believes thoroughly in ‘prestige’… and would think it (quite sincerely) in the interests of the country to spend 200 million on a war if the result of it was to make foreign states think more highly of us as a military power. These ideas are intelligible, but they are not mine, nor yours: and their being sincerely held does not make them less dangerous. We are in real danger, and it is impossible to be too careful.​[40]​

What Otte has described as ‘Derby’s dispiriting dithering’ was a quite deliberate policy to frustrate action and ensure that peace was achieved thereby.​[41]​
It has also been suggested that Derby was excluded from certain key processes. Millman, for example, proposed that the instructions to the British Fleet – once it was agreed to send it to the Dardanelles in early February – were ‘devised and settled’ between the Prime Minister, W.H. Smith [First Lord of the Admiralty] and Northcote ‘with help from Tenterden [Permanent Secretary at the Foreign Office]’.​[42]​ Yet, even if true, it is hardly surprising that these key figures were involved in the administration of a decision agreed by Cabinet – in which Derby concurred, as his diary showed.​[43]​ It was Derby, not anyone else, who drew up the telegram that subsequently went to the ambassador in Constantinople.​[44]​ The evidence does not bear close examination.
To set on the other side of the scales is evidence of the Foreign Secretary’s capacity for business in this period. His diaries were thorough; he continued to conduct diplomatic correspondence as normal; his resistance to his colleagues required him to be alert and responsive. In addition, new material has recently come to light. It has been well known for many years that he kept detailed records in Cabinet. No evidence of these has ever been discovered, other than the précis included by Derby in his diaries. In archival material recently unearthed at Knowsley, however, the first examples of Derby’s detailed notes have emerged. The notes cover the period from mid-February to late March, precisely that for which Derby’s competence has been called into question. The batch of papers incorporates notes from fifteen Cabinet meetings, with a cover sheet suggesting there were also notes concerning a sixteenth, on 18 March.​[45]​ They are extremely detailed, recording all the major (and many minor) contributions by Cabinet members. Their very existence suggests that Derby, whatever the quality of his contributions to Cabinet, was certainly not excluded from its business or incapacitated. Other than successive Prime Ministers’ letters to the monarch and comments in political diaries, the notes constitute the only records we have – and certainly the only detailed ones – of any Cabinet meetings prior to the First World War. They do not suggest a man in a condition of ‘utter moral prostration.’ They do suggest thoroughness and close attention to detail, not usually hallmarks of incompetence and disengagement.
The surviving papers reveal no ‘inner Cabinet’ and no evidence of anything other than a normal policy-making process, however inconclusive it might at times have been. Why, then, did this story emerge? In Charmley’s view, it was simply in order to justify the fact that Derby had been taken back into the Cabinet.​[46]​ But this only tells half a story. In 1878 his erstwhile colleagues had no need to come up with any such explanation; he had resigned and his career seemed over. The answer lies in the fact that his career was not over. The genesis of the story and its function is discernible if one turns to domestic politics two years after the events it concerned – a period contemporary with the appearance of the principal record, Balfour’s memorandum of the conversation with his uncle. In the circumstances of late 1879 and early 1880, Derby’s reputation started to matter far more than it had for the previous two years, when Beaconsfield and Salisbury’s success at Berlin had left him washed up on the cross-benches, withdrawn and irrelevant.


The changing context of political debate in the 1870s and early 1880s, and the accompanying redefinition of party, turned Derby’s reputation into political currency in a recognisably modern manner; it was the subject of ‘spin’ by both sides at the crucial juncture of the 1879-80 election campaign. The two decades from 1865 – between the death of Viscount Palmerston and Gladstone’s embracing of Home Rule for Ireland – were transitional ones; party identities were in flux, a process prompted in part by the second Reform Act of 1867 and partly by changes in personnel. The election of 1880 was only the third one fought on the new, expanded franchise introduced in 1867; the parties tussled for the affections of an electorate whose allegiances were as yet unclear, having delivered notable victories to the Liberals in 1868 and the Conservatives in 1874. Both parties faced significant internal and external strains. Political territory was hotly contested during the prelude to the 1880 election, the campaign itself and its aftermath.
With his defection to the Liberals in March 1880, Derby’s reputation mattered to both sides of the political divide. His authority and moderation in foreign policy seemed to be assets for a Liberal party that was seeking to take advantage of the Government’s misfortunes while it papered over its own internal cracks. Until the death of Palmerston – the first ‘Liberal’ Prime Minister – the party had juxtaposed mild conservatism at home with vocal and sometimes material support for liberalism abroad. Subsequently, in government under William Gladstone between 1868 and 1874, it had coupled a non-interventionist foreign policy with reforming zeal at home. Although Gladstone had nominally retired after the Conservative election victory of 1874, it was he who had given Liberalism its campaigning edge in 1876 over the ‘Bulgarian Atrocities’, when the Conservative government had seemed, by inaction, to connive at the massacres of Slavs by their Ottoman Turkish rulers. Gladstone would be similarly energetic during his Midlothian campaign in the winter of 1879-80. But the party he was attempting to inspire was a very broad church indeed; its representatives ranged from patrician Whigs like its leaders in the Commons, Lord Hartington (heir to the Duke of Devonshire), and the Lords, Earl Granville, to veteran radicals such as John Bright and grassroots municipal leaders such as Joseph Chamberlain. The range of forces reflected the breadth of Liberal sentiment in the country, from conservative, Whiggish Palmerstonians to zealous nonconformists. In September 1879, Lord Kimberley – a former diplomat and future Liberal Foreign Secretary – reviewed the political situation and considered it a volatile one: ‘The government are going to the dogs, and will fare badly at the general election; and what is called the Liberal party consists of fragments.’​[47]​
In this context, if – as modern-day electioneers might put it – the electoral narrative was to be ‘framed’ in a manner convenient to the respective party leaderships, then utilising Derby’s political character was a means of achieving advantage and definition for both Conservatives and Liberals. For the Conservatives, Derby’s reputation was a target in their attempt to prevent the Liberals subverting the perceived Conservative achievements of 1874-1880, particularly in foreign policy. Meanwhile Derby’s defection helped reinforce the message of contemporary Liberalism, that Beaconsfield’s government had instead subverted Conservatism; it assisted a process by which the Liberals might absorb moderate Conservatives and redefine the central ground of politics. 
If the Conservatives were to be re-elected, foreign and imperial policy would need to be handled carefully; it had been of vital political importance for the previous four years. As Swartz has noted, foreign policy-makers ‘continued to pursue British interests, but they now had to find political support for their efforts in an era when millions of men had the right to vote.’​[48]​ It was clear from 1879 that an election was coming, probably sooner rather than later. Given the Atrocities campaign of 1876 and the dramatic events of the Eastern crisis, during which the Conservatives had appeared to change direction following Derby’s resignation, the nature of foreign policy would be central to the campaign. Derby’s reputation was, in turn, bound up with that policy, as both parties recognised and utilised. When Derby reappeared on the national stage in March 1880, his role in recent Conservative politics once more attracted attention, along with the foreign policy of the government in which he had served.
In the election campaign, the defence of Conservative policy fell principally to Lord Salisbury. With Beaconsfield increasingly infirm, Salisbury’s role became more important. In a speech at Manchester Free Trade Hall on 17 October 1879, in the electorally vital county of Lancashire, Salisbury signalled the beginning of the campaign, though it would be several months before Parliament was dissolved. He gave notice that ‘There is no doubt…that the present Parliament is hastening on to an inevitable term.’ As the election could have been held at any time up to the spring of 1881, this was a telling phrase. Britain’s position overseas would undoubtedly constitute a key electoral battleground. Salisbury accepted that ‘the election which is impending, deeply as it will affect certain interesting questions of home politics, is more important still in respect of foreign politics.’​[49]​ 
Being both Foreign Secretary and Beaconsfield’s de facto deputy, Salisbury knew he had to define the terms of debate. He acknowledged that ‘it is natural that you should scrutinise carefully the acts of those who hold the reins of power, and that you should examine what their title is to the renewal of your confidence.’​[50]​ In their appeal to the electorate, the Conservatives had one clear success they could point to: the Congress of Berlin. There, Beaconsfield and Salisbury had worked with the German Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, to solve the Eastern Crisis. They had done so by dramatically scaling back the Russian gains made from the Turks at San Stefano. They had obtained Cyprus for Britain, protected Turkey from Russian designs and prevented the creation of a so-called ‘Big Bulgaria’, which, had it emerged, was widely expected to be a Russian client state. In the process they had appeared as the arbiters of Europe. Although the passage of two years had produced cracks in some of the Treaty of Berlin’s provisions, the success of the Congress was still an electoral asset. Accordingly Salisbury drew the electorate’s attention back to that crucial moment, telling them that

if you ask us how we have discharged our stewardship, I will ask you in return to compare the state of affairs with what it was on the morning that the San Stefano treaty was signed. Look at the military position of Russia then and now; look at the territorial position of Turkey then and now; look at the sympathies expressed by Austria and still more by Germany, and I think you will acknowledge that, as far as Her Majesty’s Government have had any share in the shaping of these events, an adequate guard has been provided for the interests and for the position which it was their duty to protect.​[51]​

To set against the apparent success of Berlin were significant difficulties. Firstly, the government had endured imperial setbacks in Afghanistan and South Africa. Secondly, there were plenty of electors whose liberal consciences were uncomfortable with the idea of upholding Turkey, an apparently despotic power with a non-Christian religion. The ‘Bulgarian Atrocities’ were not going to be forgotten in a hurry. And if there was any danger of that happening, the electorate would certainly be reminded by the Liberal leadership, not least Mr Gladstone, emerging once more from ‘retirement’. As became clear in late 1879, he had a major public campaign ready, every bit as powerful as the one he had conducted in 1876. He would march around the Midlothian constituency of Edinburgh decrying the government’s various failings. The government would need to meet the expected Liberal onslaught. 
The Liberals were accordingly characterised by ministers as men who would let British influence slip away: where the Conservatives had been firm, the Liberals would be weak. Salisbury made that clear at Manchester, when he suggested that the Liberals ‘have so framed the issue that if a Liberal Ministry returns to power every State in Europe will understand that…the policy of the present Government is to be undone. Every State in Europe will understand that England retires from the position that she occupies, and accepts the abdication of power to which she submitted in 1871 and 1873.’​[52]​ His references were to the creation of the new German Empire in 1871, which the Liberal Government had watched from the sidelines, apparently impotent, and the Dreikaiserbund (League of the Three Emperors) of 1873, in which the Germans, Russians and Austrians had agreed to co-operate to their own ends, again with Britain marginalised. Salisbury’s condemnation of Liberal weakness was echoed by his colleagues up to the election. Shortly before Parliament was dissolved, Beaconsfield declared in the Lords that ‘the best security for possessing general peace lies in increasing and upholding the influence of this country.’ But, he warned, ‘the opposite system has been tried’ by the Liberal government of 1868-74, and ‘if we have had to meet great difficulties, if we have found affairs in Asia and in Europe complicated and confused, why, they were the consequence, I will say, of the policy of those who preceded us. That policy we have not followed.’​[53]​ So much was the normal currency of electoral campaigns, but the Conservative leadership knew that they could not limit themselves to attacks on earlier Liberal policies; if they were to counter criticism of their own handling of affairs, they needed to be prepared.
The Conservatives needed to frame the narrative: after six years in power, what was it that defined Conservative foreign policy and made it distinctive? Therein lay a significant challenge: how to explain what the Conservatives stood for, when their diplomacy appeared to have been guided in two very different ways. Four years of pacific policy under Derby had been succeeded by belligerence at the encouragement of Beaconsfield. Derby’s resignation had been preceded by a period of intense Cabinet disagreement that had paralysed business and been public knowledge. The Prime Minister himself was in a particularly difficult position. Despite his crowing about the successes of Berlin, he was also the man who had presided over the previous four years and the Cabinet stalemate, and who had worked closely with Derby until that time. The ambiguity of the Conservative record presented a problem. Derby’s role thus became significant once more. Events on 15 March 1880, less than two weeks before the dissolution of Parliament on 24 March, focused the Conservative leadership’s enmity on the former Foreign Secretary.
Derby’s role was of particular concern in the prelude to the election. It was no secret that the Liberals were keen to obtain his support. The Derby influence might be vital in Lancashire, home of the family seat, Knowsley Hall, and a county whose significance was keenly appreciated by both political parties. No less a Liberal figure than Hartington would be contesting North East Lancashire. As Jennifer Davey has described, Derby had been dithering for some time over whether or not to throw in his lot with the Liberals, and his wife had been urging him to do so. One leading Liberal, Sir William Harcourt, apparently thought that ‘Ld D[erby] had but to hold up his little finger &...two liberals would come in’ for one of Lancashire’s seats.​[54]​ By the end of December 1879, a former colleague and companion in resignation, the Earl of Carnarvon, felt that Derby had ‘to all intents and purposes, if not openly, joined the opposition’.​[55]​ But it took Derby some months to declare himself. It was the imminence of the general election that forced his hand. After much thought, he wrote a public letter in support of Lord Sefton, the Liberal candidate in South West Lancashire. On 15 March, the letter was published in The Times. ‘I have been long unwilling to separate from the political connexion in which I was brought up’, wrote Derby, but ‘the present situation of parties and the avowed policy of the Conservative leader in reference to foreign relations leave me no choice.’ Having decided, he was emphatic: ‘I cannot support the present Government, and as neutrality, however from personal feelings I might prefer it, is at a political crisis an evasion of public duty, I have no choice except to declare myself, however reluctantly, ranked among their opponents.’​[56]​ 
From a Liberal perspective, the timing was perfect: the same day, the government’s foreign policy came under sustained attack from its opponents in the House of Lords. As Hardy (now at the India Office and ennobled as Lord Cranbrook), noted in his diary, ‘Granville and his myrmidons had a surprise for us.’​[57]​ Using a debate about the Afghan situation as a pretext, Lord Campbell led an assault on the policies of the previous six years, which the Liberals in the Lords then took as an opportunity to attack the government on a wider basis. Campbell alleged that ‘it is thrown out by various supporters of the Government that we are not entitled to look back on the transactions which have all flowed from the autumn of 1874’.​[58]​ ‘But’, he countered, ‘the electors must review the foreign policy of the last five years in order to arrive at a judicial verdict on the conduct of the Government.’​[59]​ He moved on to reject the notion that the government could hide behind Derby to avoid any criticisms of their policy before 1878: ‘The noble Earl the Prime Minister [Beaconsfield]…can never possibly resort to such a shelter. He can never be inclined to dispute…that each decision upon foreign policy involves the sanction of the person by whom the Cabinet is guided.’​[60]​
The Liberals then seized the chance to criticise foreign policy throughout the years of Conservative government. Granville led the assault. Despite the Cabinet’s claims to have preserved peace, he pointed out that, in Europe, ‘there has been a war, a war which, as was believed by us at the time, might have been prevented by a policy of united pressure by the whole of Europe to compel the carrying out of the Treaty promises – a war which the Prime Minister once told us could have been prevented if his strong Government had done that which they did not do.’​[61]​ In response to Beaconsfield’s retort that the Liberals had left Britain in a weakened position when they left office in 1874, Kimberley recalled Derby’s own verdict on the Liberal years: ‘Unless his memory deceived him, he had heard the noble Earl (the Earl of Derby) the Foreign Minister serving under the noble Earl opposite [Beaconsfield], declare that when he succeeded to power the opinions of this country had never been received with more respect.’ Kimberley asked whether ‘anyone who was not to be led away by magniloquent phrases’ could believe ‘that the state of Europe, when the present Government acceded to Office, could have been brought about by the conduct of the late [Liberal] Government?’​[62]​ Lord Ripon rose to allege that the Government’s attempts to distance themselves from Derby’s tenure had led them to make claims that could not be sustained by the evidence. Turning to the Bulgarian Atrocities, he suggested that ‘it had always been the custom of Her Majesty’s Government and their supporters in the country to assert that the strong feelings which those occurrences aroused in this country were the result of Mr Gladstone’s pamphlet’. Instead of blaming his former leader’s pamphlet, ‘Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East’, though, he noted the chronology of events in 1876: ‘the fact was that the Earl of Derby’s despatch, denouncing those outrages in the strongest terms, was written before that pamphlet.’​[63]​ It seems unlikely that Ripon or anyone else seriously believed that Derby, rather than Gladstone, was responsible for the 1876 agitation, but there was a striking disparity between the Conservatives’ (Derby-led) foreign policy up to 1878 and their later, violently pro-Turk phase.
The Conservative speakers attempted to resist the charges laid against them. Cranbrook declared that the Conservative party had ‘the honour and interests of England at heart, and were prepared to maintain them’ in a way the Liberal party could not. Cairns took a different tack. He explained away any disparity between different periods of the government’s tenure by suggesting that, although all might have seemed well in 1874, ‘it was not, however, till years afterwards when Her Majesty’s Government found it necessary to make the voice of England heard.’ In his account, it was only later that the Conservatives had discovered ‘that, both by the traditions of the [Liberal] Government which had gone before and from the language which had been held from time to time by Members of that Government, the influence of this country was becoming weakened.’ Lord Selborne was unconvinced, and described what Cairns had said as ‘diametrically opposite to what had been stated by his colleague, the former Foreign Secretary [Derby]; who said not merely…that they found the relations of this country with Foreign Powers satisfactory [in 1874], but that there never was a time at which the influence of this country stood higher.’​[64]​ Although two years out of office, Derby – perceived on both sides as the voice of moderate conservatism (or moderate liberalism, depending on one’s perspective) – was a pivot around which discussion of foreign policy could revolve. Kimberley recorded in his diary that ‘Derby’s defection [,] though no surprise, is nevertheless a grave loss to the Tories.’​[65]​
The Conservative leadership recognised the danger, and therein seems to lie the origin of the ‘inner Cabinet’ story, at least in the form in which it gained circulation. It is surely no accident that the first evidence of the story dates from precisely this point, a conjunction hitherto overlooked. Three days after the Lords debate, on 18 March 1880, Salisbury wrote to his nephew Balfour. ‘Is it not time’, he asked, ‘to dissipate the absurd assumption that the present Cabinet is responsible for all that Derby said or did, or left undone[?]’. He outlined the difficulty and a solution: ‘Of course, we cannot in view of the constitutional fiction [of collective responsibility] repudiate the responsibility ourselves: but’, he noted, ‘no such hindrance need affect others.’​[66]​ This was a clear invitation for Conservative allies to damage Derby’s credibility. Salisbury evidently intended Balfour to act on it. It has the ring about it of the open invitation issued by a later Conservative statesman, Geoffrey Howe, whose differences with Mrs Thatcher had precipitated his resignation in 1990. He would call upon his colleagues ‘to consider their own response to the tragic conflict of loyalties with which I have myself wrestled for perhaps too long’.​[67]​ No direct instruction was needed, but his fellow MP Michael Heseltine knew what was required of him, and the evidence suggests that Balfour did too. If there is any doubt about Salisbury’s intentions, it is dispelled by Balfour’s contemporaneous note of the conversation with his uncle, the principal record of the ‘inner Cabinet’ story which of course implied that the Foreign Secretary was an incompetent drunkard. It provided the ammunition for the proposed character assassination. It seems likely that Salisbury, Cairns and Balfour were deliberately seeking to discredit Derby in order to neutralise the threat he represented at the election. They were able to build upon ground already prepared by others: dark rumours about Derby’s character and that of his wife had already been circulating for some time, encouraged by Beaconsfield and Queen Victoria.
What the rumours and stories demonstrate is that Derby’s reputation in foreign policy was a weapon for both parties as they fought for advantage in the election campaign; this was clear in the wake of his defection. Liberals rejoiced in the evidence of mild Conservatism transferring its allegiance to them. At Hartington’s speech in Accrington on 15 March, ‘a great display of enthusiasm was evoked by the reading of a telegraphed copy of Lord Derby’s letter to Lord Sefton.’​[68]​ From the heart of Chamberlain’s territory, the Birmingham Daily Post issued a warning to the government: ‘Such a declaration, from such a man [as Derby], should induce even Conservatives to reflect upon the position in which Lord Beaconsfield has placed them. In Lancashire’, it asserted, ‘it will certainly influence the contest in a marked degree.’​[69]​ The Dublin-based Freeman’s Journal agreed: ‘On many a hustings, on every hustings throughout the length and breadth of the land…the question, “Why did Lord Derby leave the Jingoes?” ought to be a crucial one.’​[70]​
Tory opinion, on the other hand, was contemptuous of Derby’s shift from the kind of Conservatism embodied by Beaconsfield. The Pall Mall Gazette was scathing about Derby, whose ‘accession to the [Liberal] party signifies a more determined peace-at-any-price policy, should they gain power, than ever was threatened before.’​[71]​ Speaking at Warrington on 19 March, the Home Secretary, Richard Cross, criticised his former mentor. He reminded his audience that Derby’s despatch of 6 May 1877, warning Russia against the occupation of Constantinople, had taken the firm line which exemplified Lord Beaconsfield’s foreign policy, and ‘if we had drawn back we should have been in the most disgraceful and humiliating position.’ Cross declared that ‘there are times and there are circumstances when, whatever your horror or dread of war may be, you are bound in a sacred duty.’​[72]​ Neither Liberalism nor Lord Derby, he made clear, was to be entrusted with that duty. The Examiner felt sure that ‘Mr Cross’s speech at Warrington on Thursday will…show the Lancashire men and the rest of the world how utterly miserable and futile was Lord Derby’s conduct when it was put to a serious test.’ It thought Derby ‘a man utterly and hopelessly ignorant of the first maxims of sound foreign policy.’​[73]​ 

Derby’s reputation had thus become part of party-political discourse, representing the virtues or ills of respective policies as the parties exchanged blows over foreign affairs. It is clear that the origin of the ‘inner Cabinet’ story lies in this process. Close analysis of the surviving evidence provides no convincing corroboration of the allegation that the Foreign Secretary had lost command of foreign policy between late January and late March 1878. A sceptic might contend that evidence was destroyed or never committed to paper, but there would be no reason for the former (every reason for Derby’s enemies to preserve it, in fact) nor logic to the latter. Instead the evidence seems to suggest exactly the reverse: a thwarted Prime Minister was resorting to ineffectual subterfuge to try and produce a more ‘active’ foreign policy, which he was only finally able to pursue once his Foreign Secretary had resigned. The toxicity of the allegations surrounding Derby reflected the ferocity of the election campaign and the process of party readjustment in foreign policy. That ongoing redefinition was evident not just from the efforts to which Derby’s former colleagues went to damage his reputation, but also from the advantage his presence seemed to offer to the Liberals in defining their own position.
As a former Foreign Secretary, Derby’s value to the Liberals was threefold: his defection was useful in the run-up to the election, and he added to Liberal strength in the Lords, but his much greater value was as a symbol of moderate conservatism. If the Liberal majority was to be maintained and Liberal projects were to succeed, then the support of moderate conservatives in the expanded electorate would be vital. In that moderate mould, Derby represented the kind of ‘calm, temperate, deliberate, and conciliatory’ foreign policy espoused by his father for twenty years as Conservative leader, as well as by Sir Robert Peel and the Earl of Aberdeen.​[74]​ Equally, from Salisbury’s point of view, if a permanent drift of conservative voters away from Beaconsfield’s party was to be prevented, then – among many other things – Derby’s reputation in foreign policy had to be discredited.
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